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INTRODUCTION 
Corruption has long been understood as a pervasive problem plaguing 
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China’s business environment.1  The country ranked 80th on the latest 
annual Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency 
International in 2013, lower than Brazil and South Africa.2  A high degree 
of government involvement in economic affairs and a business culture 
emphasizing personal ties and informal relationships are believed to have 
contributed to widespread corrupt practices, which continue to pose 
significant challenges to foreign corporations with investment and 
operations on the ground.3  A long list of high profile multinationals 
implicated in corruption scandals in China4 has in recent months included 
big names such as Avon Products, Inc., GlaxoSmithKline plc, and J.P. 
Morgan Chase & Co.5 
Even without conducting business in China or with Chinese 
counterparties, investors may become exposed to China’s corruption risks 
by investing in securities issued by Chinese or “China-based” companies.6  
 
 1.  See, e.g., Delia Poon, Exposure to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Guide for U.S. 
Companies with Activities in the People’s Republic of China to Minimize Liability, 19 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 327, 339–45 (1996) (identifying local conditions that create significant exposure to 
the FCPA for U.S. companies doing business in China); F. Joseph Warin et al., FCPA Compliance in 
China and the Gifts and Hospitality Challenge, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 33, 59–60 (2010) (discussing the 
corruption risks presented by Chinese traditions of gift giving in professional contexts). 
 2.  TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2013, available at 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results (follow “Download Brochure” hyperlink). 
 3.  See, e.g., Daniel Chow, The Interplay Between China’s Anti-bribery Laws and the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1015, 1021–24 (2012) (discussing the FCPA compliance 
challenges posed by the continued dominance of state-owned enterprises in China’s important 
economic sectors); Nicole Y. Hines, Cultural Due Diligence: The Lost Diligence That Must Be Found 
by U.S. Corporations Conducting M&A Deals in China to Prevent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Violations, 9 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 19, 55–61 (2007) (discussing how Chinese cultural norms of guanxi and 
mianzi affect Chinese corporate culture in connection with FCPA compliance); Warin et al., supra note 
1. 
 4.  See Warin et al., supra note 1, at 48–55 (listing significant China-related FCPA investigations 
against multinational companies). 
 5.  See Ben Hirschler, Bribery Scandal Slashes GlaxoSmithKline’s Chinese Drug Sales, 
REUTERS, Oct. 23, 2013, 10:19 AM EDT, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/23/us-
gsk-earnings-idUSBRE99M0DB20131023; Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan 
Tracked Business Linked to China Hiring, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 7, 2013, 1:24 PM), http:// 
dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/07/bank-tabulated-business-linked-to-china-hiring/?_r=0; David 
Voreacos, China’s Bribery Culture Poses Risks for Multinationals, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 21, 2013, 
12:01 AM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-21/china-s-bribery-culture-poses-risks-for-
multinationals.html. 
 6.  For various regulatory and taxation reasons, many Chinese companies have restructured 
themselves and have adopted an overseas holding structure when engaging in fundraising transactions, 
including venture capital/private equity investments and securities offerings in the international capital 
markets.  Typically, these companies will make the issuer of securities a special purpose vehicle, 
incorporated in the United States or in one of the offshore financial centers (e.g., the Grand Cayman 
Islands, Bermuda, or the British Virgin Islands), which controls through an equity interest or contractual 
arrangements the company’s operating business assets within China.  See, e.g., Jing Li, Venture Capital 
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Corruption risks may affect securities investors in multiple ways.  The 
eruption of corruption and fraud scandals involving China-based 
companies could lead to market volatility and trading disruption in the 
companies’ securities.7  Enforcement actions under Chinese laws and 
extraterritorially applied anti-corruption laws, such as the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (the FCPA), generally have a significantly negative impact on 
a company’s normal operations and business prospects and consequently 
on its investment value.8  Those companies that strive to comply with 
applicable anti-corruption laws may also see their competitiveness and 
profitability reduced if their competitors engage in corrupt business 
practices.9 
Although the latest wave of accounting scandals, shareholder 
litigation, and regulatory actions led to the delisting and deregistration of 
dozens of China-based companies,10 the total count of China-based 
companies registered with the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the SEC) likely remains over 200.11  Beyond the public 
 
Investments in China: The Use of Offshore Financing Structures and Corporate Relocations, 1 MICH. J. 
PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 1, 26–37 (2012) (describing laws and regulations that contributed 
to the prevalent use of this offshore investment structure in venture capital investment in Chinese 
companies).  In this way, many issuers discussed in this article are technically not “Chinese” companies 
in light of their place of incorporation and should more appropriately be referred to as “China-based” 
companies. 
 7.  See, e.g., Mia Lamar, CCTV Investigation Targets Chinese Drug Maker, WALL ST. J. 
MONEYBEAT (Sept. 12, 2013, 2:15 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/09/12/cctv-
investigation-targets-chinese-drug-maker/ (reporting price declines for all China-based pharmaceutical 
companies listed in Hong Kong following publicized bribery accusation about one drug company). 
 8.  See Hirschler, supra note 5 (discussing the negative impact of a bribery scandal on 
GlaxoSmithKline’s sales and reputation). 
 9.  See MINXIN PEI, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, POLICY BRIEF 55, CORRUPTION 
THREATENS CHINA’S FUTURE 6 (2007), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb55_ 
pei_china_corruption_final.pdf (“Corruption creates serious obstacles for Western companies facing 
rivals who engage in illegal practices in order to win business in China.”); but see Shaun Rein, How To 
Deal with Corruption in China, FORBES, Oct. 7, 2009, 5:17 PM, http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/07/ 
china-corruption-bribes-leadership-managing-rein.html (advising companies to avoid engaging in 
corrupt activities in China and noting that commercial corruption in China is declining). 
 10.  23 Chinese Companies Delisted in US Since Last Year, WANT CHINA TIMES (Aug. 14, 2012, 
11:46), http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20120814000039&cid=1102. 
 11.  According to one count, as of June 2012, nearly 300 China-based firms were listing their 
securities on U.S. exchanges, and many more firms were quoted on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin 
Board (OTCBB) and on other OTC markets.  See Zigan Wang, US-Listed Chinese Firms in Credibility 
Crisis: Who Are They? Where Are They? 2 (Columbia Univ., Working Paper, 2012), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=2177450.  Another count mentioned that that there were over 1000 companies in 
total trading in U.S. markets by the end of 2011.  Zhou Xuan & Shen Xing (周煊, 申星), Zhong Guo 
Qi Ye Hai Wai Tui Shi Si Kao: Jin Tui Zhi Jian De Pai Huai (中国企业海外退市思考：进退之间的徘
徊) [Thoughts on Overseas Delistings of Chinese Companies: Going Forward or Backward], 100 
GUOJI JINGJI PINGLUN (国际经济评论) [INT’L ECON. REV.] 135, 135 (2012) (China).  One source 
mentioned that a net delisting of 53 China-based companies took place between 2010 and 2012.  
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offering market, many China-based companies have also gained access to 
massive amounts of U.S. capital over the past decade through exempted 
global offerings of securities under Rule 144A and Regulation S.12  Absent 
dramatic changes in China’s domestic capital markets, U.S. investors and 
regulators should continue to expect a sizable flow of transactions in 
securities of China-based companies reaching the U.S. market.13 
China-based securities scandals have so far mainly concerned 
accounting irregularities as opposed to pure corruption violations.  As 
illustrated in the latest shareholder suits arising from the corruption 
investigation of PetroChina,14 however, the continuously intensifying anti-
corruption campaign that China’s current leadership is implementing15 may 
cause more corruption-related scandals to be exposed, to the detriment of 
issuers and investors.16  To protect investors, United States regulators 
should examine whether existing regulations suffice to protect against the 
corruption risks associated with China-based securities. 
 
LESSONS TO BE LEARNT – US SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS AGAINST CHINESE DOMICILED COMPANIES 
(2013), available at http://stage.plusweb.org/Portals/0/Event%20Material/Lessons%20to%20be%20 
Learnt%20-%20US%20Securities%20Class%20Actions%20Against%20Chinese%20Domiciled%20 
Companies.pdf.  Starting with the second half of 2013, market sentiment has visibly improved for 
China-based stocks.  The U.S. initial public offering (IPO) market seems to have thawed for China-
based companies after an extended frozen period, with eight new listings completed in 2013 and more 
reportedly in the pipeline for 2014.  Rebecca Fannin, China Venture Capitalists and Entrepreneurs Set 
to Get Boost from Improved IPO Outlook, Finally!, FORBES, Dec. 19, 2013, 2:21 PM, http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/rebeccafannin/2013/12/19/china-venture-capitalists-and-entrepreneurs-set-to-get-
boost-from-improved-ipo-outlook-finally/. 
 12.  See Weitseng Chen, Institutional Arbitrage: China’s Economic Power Projection and 
International Capital Markets, 26 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. (forthcoming 2013) (“In practice, [private 
placements under Rule 144A and Regulation S] have become the dominating mechanism for Chinese 
firms and the Chinese government to gain access to U.S. capital.”). 
 13.  In January 2014, an SEC administrative law judge suspended the Chinese units of the Big 
Four accounting firms from auditing U.S.-traded companies for six months.  Michael Rapoport, Judge 
Suspends Chinese Units of Big Four Auditors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2014, 1:42 AM, http://online.wsj. 
com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303448204579337183810731744.  If the ruling becomes final, it 
could create significant obstacles for China-based companies to obtaining U.S. listings.  The accounting 
firms appealed the ruling in February 2014, but the review process within the SEC and potentially in a 
court of appeals (if the SEC upholds the ruling and the firms seek further court review) could take a 
long time (months at least for administrative review and years for judicial proceedings); as a result, the 
ruling is not expected to take effect soon, if at all.  Michael Rapoport, China Units of Big-Four Firms 
Appeal Audit Ban, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2014, 5:47 PM, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014 
24052702303704304579379410335942436. 
 14.  See sources cited infra note 72. 
 15.  See, e.g., China Probes Vice Public Security Chief amid Graft Crackdown, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS (Dec. 21, 2013), available at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-12-20/china-probes-
deputy-public-security-chief-amid-graft-crackdown. 
 16.  Kevin LaCroix, Corruption Allegations: More Securities Suits Against U.S.-Listed Chinese 
Companies?, D&O DIARY (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/09/articles/securities-
litigation/corruption-allegations-more-securities-suits-against-u-s-listed-chinese-companies/. 
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This Article discusses the ways in which securities disclosure 
requirements can and should be used to potentially enhance investor 
protections with respect to China’s corruption risks.  In particular, it argues 
that the current securities disclosure rules’ reliance on a standard-based 
requirement for corruption risk disclosures is problematic; to address 
certain practical challenges facing the parties involved in the disclosure 
drafting process, a more specific rule-based directive that can be expected 
to enhance due diligence and disclosure practices over corruption risks of 
China-based securities should be adopted.  Part I discusses the information 
rationale for using risk disclosure to regulate corruption risks.  Part II 
describes the current disclosure requirement for corruption risks, which is 
based on a materiality standard that leaves to the issuers the exercise of 
considerable judgment over disclosure.  Part III demonstrates the deficient 
corruption risk disclosures made by China-based companies under the 
standard-based requirement.  Part IV discusses certain practical challenges 
present in the disclosure drafting process that have contributed to the 
deficient disclosures and due diligence of the corruption risks of China-
based companies.  Parts V and VI propose using a rule-based disclosure 
requirement and preliminarily discuss possible objections to such a 
proposal, respectively. 
I. REGULATING CORRUPTION RISKS THROUGH INFORMATION 
DISCLOSURE 
When Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977, it gave the SEC civil 
authority to enforce both the Act’s anti-bribery and accounting 
provisions.17  Given the SEC’s traditional role as the chief regulator of the 
capital markets, critics have questioned the appropriateness of having the 
SEC enforce the FCPA, especially the anti-bribery provision.18  This 
Article does not engage in similar debate about whether and how the SEC 
and other regulators should fight overseas corruption in China through 
enforcing substantive laws such as the FCPA.  Instead, it proposes that the 
SEC’s traditional regulatory toolkit, in particular the disclosure rules, 
should not be overlooked when the Commission considers protecting 
investors from corruption risks. 
 
 17.  See Wallace L. Timmeny, SEC Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. ANN. 25, 26–27 (1979) (noting that the SEC may use its civil enforcement 
power under the Exchange Act and the SEC’s Rules of Practice to enforce the FCPA and related rules, 
whereas the Department of Justice was not provided with civil investigative tools). 
 18.  See, e.g., Barbara Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global 
Corruption is Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093 (2012) (challenging the SEC’s role 
in enforcing FCPA). 
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U.S. securities regulation fundamentally relies on disclosure 
requirements and related liabilities to regulate investment risk issues.  As 
early as 1979, the SEC sought, though unsuccessfully, to bolster the 
FCPA’s accounting provision through disclosure mechanisms that would 
have imposed certain Sarbanes-Oxley-style requirements of internal control 
reporting.19  Although such a requirement was ultimately incorporated into 
the securities laws decades later,20 requirements for risk factor disclosures, 
another avenue that the securities laws often pursue to regulate risks, have 
not been afforded sufficient attention from lawmakers and regulators. 
U.S. securities laws currently require domestic and foreign securities 
issuers to disclose important risk factors affecting their operations and 
prospects in the registration statements that contain their offering 
prospectuses and also in periodic filings.21  In theory, there are at least two 
important ways in which risk disclosure requirements could be used to 
regulate securities investment risks and to protect investors.  First, risk 
disclosures could reduce information asymmetry in the market and enable 
investors to make informed investment decisions.22  Second, mandatory 
disclosure requirements might motivate corporate executives to implement 
enhanced risk management.23  This Part considers the potential information 
benefits of risk disclosures in the context of the corruption risks of China-
based securities. 
Although there have long been complaints that risk disclosures are 
 
 19.  U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN 
REGULATION S-K 22 n.58 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosure-
requirements-review.pdf. 
 20.  See Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of 
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8238, Exchange Act Release 
No. 47,986, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,068, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003). 
 21.  In practice, due to liability management considerations, offering documents in connection 
with non-registered transactions under Rule 144A and Regulation S also disclose risk factors because, 
although Rule 144A and Regulation S offerings are not subject to the same mandatory disclosure 
requirements imposed on registered offerings under the securities laws, they are not exempt from the 
anti-fraud liability provisions.  See ZE’-EV D. EIGER, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT 
REGULATION S 21 (2013), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/FAQs-Regulation-
S.pdf (noting that, compared with a registered offering, a Rule 144A/Regulation S offering is subject to 
more flexible disclosure requirements but that the anti-fraud provisions are still applicable).  To 
simplify discussion, this Article focuses on the risk disclosure requirements for companies and 
securities registered with the SEC. 
 22.  See Susanna Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary 
Warnings in Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 929, 929–31 (noting that 
investors use specialized forward-looking statements disclosed by issuers to evaluate risks of 
investments). 
 23.  See Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 113, 123–25 (Summer 1999) (“Required disclosure . . . will make [the management] try harder 
to avoid actions that will generate negative information.”). 
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often meaningless boilerplates, the available empirical evidence 
demonstrates that legally-required risk disclosures do have an impact on 
the market perception of risks.24  For example, in a recent study, 
researchers found a positive correlation between risk disclosures and post-
disclosure trading patterns, suggesting that, on average, risk disclosures are 
meaningful even under the current disclosure requirements.25  Furthermore, 
studies have also shown that there is sound basis for the market to respond 
to risk disclosures because issuers subject to the disclosure requirements 
are generally motivated to produce risk information that corresponds to 
their own risk assessment.26  Even if they do not have much faith in the 
empirics, however, lawmakers and the SEC should consider risk disclosure 
as a potentially useful mechanism for regulating securities risks by 
informing investors. 
Empirical studies on the market perception of the disclosure of 
corruption risk factors have not been performed at this time.  But relevant 
considerations can still be debated and analyzed.  Practitioners in the 
United States disagree on whether corruption risk disclosures provide any 
benefits to investors.  For example, one lawyer criticized the typical FCPA 
risk factor language as mostly superfluous, referencing as an example 
Google’s filings.27  Specifically, such disclosure tends to state little more 
than the obvious: that U.S. companies with foreign operations are subject to 
the FCPA.28  In addition, the disclosing company tends to admit in such a 
 
 24.  See, e.g., John L. Campbell et al., The Information Content of Mandatory Risk Factor 
Disclosures in Corporate Filings, 19 REV. ACCT. STUD. 396, 398 (2014) (finding a positive association 
between risk factor disclosures and post-disclosure market beta and stock return volatility, suggesting 
that investors incorporate risk disclosures into their assessments of firm risk and value); Todd Kravet & 
Volkan Muslu, Textual Risk Disclosures and Investors’ Risk Perceptions, 18 REV. ACCT. STUD. 1088 
(2013) (finding that changes in the number of risk sentences in disclosures correlate with investors’ 
assessments).  But see Feng Li, Do Stock Market Investors Understand the Risk Sentiment of Corporate 
Annual Reports? 5–6 (Univ. of Mich. Stephen M. Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper, 2006), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=898181 (finding that when risk sentiment 
increases, future earnings decrease, and investors underreact—or fail to react altogether—to the 
disclosures); Yatin Mirakur, Risk Disclosure in SEC Corporate Filings (Univ. of Pa. Wharton Res. 
Scholars J., Working Paper, 2011), available at http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1088&context=wharton_research_scholars (finding that risk disclosures do not accurately predict a 
disclosing firm’s future events). 
 25.  See Campbell et al., supra note 24. 
 26.  Id.; see also Karen K. Nelson & A. C. Pritchard, Litigation Risk and Voluntary Disclosure: 
The Use of Meaningful Cautionary Language (2d Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, 
Working Paper, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998590 
(showing that firms’ risk disclosure corresponds to the level of litigation risks that they face). 
 27.  See Nicole Di Schino, When and How Companies Should Include FCPA Risk Disclosures in 
SEC Filings, FCPA REP., Sept. 26, 2013, available at http://www.troutmansanders.com/files/Uploads/ 
Documents/brownfcparisksecfilings.pdf. 
 28.  Id. 
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risk factor that despite its efforts, the acts of its employees or of third 
parties may still render it in violation of the law.29  Such practice was 
criticized for unnecessarily raising question about the effectiveness of such 
a company’s compliance program.30  But reasonable minds could certainly 
differ.  Since the FCPA does not apply to every U.S. publicly traded 
company, the risk factors associated with the FCPA are in fact less 
“generic” than some more universally applicable risk factors, such as that 
of the potential absence of a trading market for new securities, that are 
nevertheless recommended by the Commission.31  Furthermore, when a 
company believes that it could be subject to the FCPA and as a result could 
face the associated regulatory burdens and consequences, such a belief is 
usually derived from legal advice.  Reasonable investors would more than 
likely appreciate if such private knowledge procured at cost were shared 
with them and would take that information into consideration. 
As for China-based companies, investors could conceivably benefit 
even more from the corruption risk information that the issuer discloses.  
Although China appears on the front pages of U.S. newspapers more 
frequently now than ever before, the average U.S. investor still has much to 
learn about corruption risks, such as the following: (i) China, and in 
particular the industry in which an issuer operates, is susceptible to a high 
level of corruption risk;32 (ii) an issuer may face high corruption risk due to 
frequent contacts with government officials or business transactions with 
government bodies;33 (iii) U.S.-incorporated issuers and foreign private 
issuers are subject to the FCPA if they list securities in the United States;34 
(iv) China-based issuers are also subject to PRC anti-corruption laws, and 
the PRC authority launches enforcement campaigns from time to time;35 (v) 
being subject to the FCPA could render the issuer less competitive than its 
 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  (Item 503) Prospectus Summary, Risk Factors, and Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges: Risk 
Factors, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2013). 
 32.  See, e.g., Bohai Pharm. Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 30 (Sept. 27, 2013) (noting 
that a series of corrupt practices occur from time to time in China as well as in the pharmaceutical 
industry); Simcere Pharm. Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 16 (Apr. 25, 2012) (noting that there 
exists in the pharmaceutical industry a series of corrupt practices, such as the acceptance by hospitals 
and medical practitioners of kickbacks, bribes, or other illegal gains or benefits from pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and distributors); . 
 33.  See, e.g., 21Vianet Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 18 (Apr. 18, 2012) (noting that 
doing business with state or government-owned enterprises or government ministries places the 
company in frequent contact with “foreign officials” under the FCPA). 
 34.  See Bohai Pharm. Grp., Inc., supra note 32; cf. 21Vianet Grp., Inc., supra note 33 
(acknowledging that the company is subject to the FCPA although it is a foreign private issuer). 
 35.  See, e.g., Simcere Pharm. Grp., Inc., supra note 32. 
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competitors in China that are not U.S.-listed companies;36 (vi) the issuer’s 
compliance system, whether already in place or still being implemented or 
improved, may nevertheless fail to ensure the compliance of employees or 
of third parties with which the issuer deals;37 (vii) some issuers, while not 
having the intent to bribe, gave gifts to government officials prior to 
becoming public companies in the United States;38 (viii) failure to comply 
with anti-corruption laws will expose the issuer to significant liabilities and 
will harm its reputation, operations, and prospects.39 
Not all companies discuss every item in this list in their risk factor 
disclosures—if they even include one in their documents—since each could 
be more appropriate for some issuers than others.  Nevertheless, if the 
securities laws could ensure that all China-based issuers assess the 
foregoing aspects of corruption risks as applied to them and consider 
disclosing accordingly, the overall information made available to investors 
(especially information specific to an issuer’s industry and private 
knowledge subtly revealed “between the lines,” such as “prior gifting”) 
might be very rich.  Not only would investors learn about each China-based 
company’s corruption risks in the handy format of SEC filings, but they 
could also more easily compare corruption risk profiles across companies.  
Although further empirical evidence is wanting, risk disclosure 
requirements in securities regulations should be seriously considered by the 
SEC in order to protect investors from the corruption risks of China-based 
securities. 
II. THE STANDARD-BASED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT FOR 
CORRUPTION RISKS 
The current legal requirement for corruption risk disclosures can be 
viewed as a standard rather than a rule.  A rule typically provides clear and 
specific guidance ex ante regarding permissible behavior; a standard, in 
comparison, looks mushy and flexible before the act and is often given 
content specific to the relevant factual circumstances by the adjudicator ex 
post.40  As a result, in choosing a course of action ex ante under a standard-
 
 36.  See, e.g., Bohai Pharm. Grp., Inc., supra note 32; China Kanghui Holdings, Annual Report 
(Form 20-F) 19 (June 3, 2011). 
 37.  See e.g., 21Vianet Grp., Inc., supra note 33; Simcere Pharm. Grp., Inc., supra note 32. 
 38.  See, e.g., Keyuan Petrochemicals, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 38 (Apr. 13, 2012) 
(disclosing that the company had, prior to going public in the United States, given small gifts to 
government officials during spring festivals, which it believed would not trigger criminal liability under 
the PRC law). 
 39.  See, e.g., supra notes 32–38. 
 40.  See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559 
(1992) (“Arguments about and definitions of rules and standards commonly emphasize the distinction 
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based legal norm, an agent could face considerable uncertainty and, 
therefore, can be expected to exercise a greater amount of judgment than 
when acting under a rule. 
The disclosure requirement for corruption risk under U.S. securities 
regulations is standard-based: there is no specific directive applicable to 
this issue.  As previously noted, risk factor disclosures are a required 
component of registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 
Securities Act)41 and of annual and quarterly filings under the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act).42  The SEC adopted 
separate but similar risk factor disclosure requirements, which are 
applicable to domestic issuers and to foreign private issuers in Item 503(c) 
of Regulation S-K and Item 3.D. of Form 20-F, respectively.43  Aside from 
the general requirements that the most significant risks should be disclosed 
and that generic risks, or “risks that could apply to any issuer or any 
offering,” should be avoided,44 Regulation S-K and Form 20-F offer very 
limited concrete guidance about which risks to disclose.  Each does provide 
a few examples of possible risks that issuers “may” consider including,45 
 
between whether the law is given content ex ante or ex post.”).  For a good summary of the “rule versus 
standard” debate in the constitutional law context, see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The 
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57–69 (1992). 
 41.  See (Item 503) Prospectus Summary, Risk Factors, and Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges: 
Risk Factors, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2013); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 1852, FORM 20-F: 
REGISTRATION FORM/ANNUAL REPORT/TRANSITION REPORT Item 3.D (2012) [hereinafter FORM 20-F]; 
see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 1981, FORM F-1: REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE 
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 (2008) [hereinafter FORM F-1] (requiring disclosure in accordance with Form 
20-F); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 870, FORM S-1: REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE 
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 (2008) [hereinafter FORM S-1] (requiring disclosure in accordance with 
Regulation S-K). 
 42.  See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c), Item 3.D; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 1673, FORM 10-K: 
ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
(2012) [hereinafter FORM 10-K] (requiring disclosure per Item 503(c)); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
SEC 1296, FORM 10-Q: GENERAL FORM FOR QUARTERLY REPORTS UNDER SECTION 13 OR 15(D) 
(2012) [hereinafter FORM 10-Q] (also requiring such disclosure); FORM 20-F, supra note 41. 
 43.  See § 229.503(c); FORM 20-F, supra note 41. 
 44.  § 229.503(c).  The instruction for Item 3.D. of Form 20-F also requires that “[r]isk factors 
should be concise and explain clearly how the risk affects the issuer or the securities.”  FORM 20-F, 
supra note 41. 
 45.  See § 229.503(c) (suggesting that risk factors may include the issuer’s “lack of an operating 
history,” its “lack of profitable operations in recent periods,” its “financial position,” its “business or 
proposed business,” and its “lack of a market for [its] common equity securities or securities convertible 
into or exercisable for common equity securities”); FORM 20-F, supra note 41 (instructing a foreign 
private issuer to consider disclosing risks such as “the nature of the business in which it is engaged or 
proposes to engage; factors relating to the countries in which it operates; the absence of profitable 
operations in recent periods; the financial position of the company; the possible absence of a liquid 
trading market for the company’s securities; reliance on the expertise of management; potential 
dilution; unusual competitive conditions; pending expiration of material patents, trademarks or 
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but corruption risk is not mentioned in those examples.46 
Consequently, whether an issuer should disclose corruption risks turns 
on materiality: the classic standard-based norm in securities regulation that 
is generally applicable to disclosure issues.47  Factual information is 
material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the 
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”48  
Where the SEC has stopped short of using its rulemaking power to 
predetermine for issuers which information is important and relevant to 
investors and therefore worth disclosing, issuers are left with the 
materiality analysis, which is often open-ended and highly fact-specific.49  
So far there has not been any court decision on the specific topic of 
corruption risk disclosure.50 
While issuers’ discretion is limited by the potential liabilities they face 
if they omit material information, there is considerable room for them to 
decide ex ante about whether corruption risks are material enough for 
disclosure and to argue that determination ex post.  By analogizing to 
similar judicial decisions and other authorities, sound arguments that 
corruption risk factors are material can be made.51  Counterarguments may 
 
contracts; or dependence on a limited number of customers or suppliers”). 
 46.  See § 229.503(c); FORM 20-F, supra note 41, Item 3.D. 
 47.  4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.9 (6th ed. 2009). 
 48.  Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309, 1318 (2011) (quoting Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988)).  The SEC also affirmed this standard.  See Staff Accounting 
Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 19, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211). 
 49.  See, e.g., Additional Information, 17 C.F.R. § 230.408(a) (2013) (“In addition to the 
information expressly required to be included in a registration statement, there shall be added such 
further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.”); Additional Information, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.12b–20 (2013) (“In addition to the information expressly required to be included in a statement or 
report, there shall be added such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the 
required statements, in light of the circumstances under which they are made not misleading.”). 
 50.  For a doctrinal analysis of the viability of securities fraud claims over the disclosure of 
China’s country risks in general, see Peter M. Friedman, Note, Risky Business: Can Faulty Country 
Risk Factors in the Prospectuses of U.S. Listed Chinese Companies Raise Violations of U.S. Securities 
Law?, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 241, 264–73 (2005) (“[A] strong case can be made that in certain 
cases, Chinese issuers, their officers, their underwriters, and their lawyers could face civil liability 
under the Securities Act’s Section 11.”). 
 51.  For example, the court has previously decided that facts pertaining to management integrity 
are likely to be deemed material.  See HAZEN, supra note 47, § 12.9[3][B].  Also, according to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s formulation, which is also accepted by some 
other courts, material facts may “include . . . those facts which affect the probable future of the 
company and those which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the company’s 
securities.”  E.g., Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 832 F.2d 726, 732 (2d Cir. 1987); SEC v. 
Mize, 615 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1980); Northway, Inc. v. TSC Industries, Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 331 
(7th Cir. 1975); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 764 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf 
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nevertheless point out that the SEC’s materiality standard focuses much 
more on the disclosure of quantifiable information rather than non-
quantifiable factors, such as corruption risks.52  Moreover, issuers have 
long been advised that they do not have a per se obligation to disclose even 
a material fact absent affirmative regulatory requirement.53 
Thinking in relatively abstract terms, allowing issuers discretion on 
corruption risk disclosures under the materiality standard could produce a 
“signaling game.”54  As issuers have different corruption risk profiles, the 
efficient equilibrium in such a signaling game, at which high-risk issuers 
disclose a greater amount of risk information and low-risk issuers disclose 
less or no risk information, could be reached.  Assuming that securities 
regulations use risk factors to make riskier securities less attractive to 
investors than less risky ones,55 achieving such a “separating equilibrium” 
would attest to the efficacy of securities law and in particular to the 
materiality standard.  In reality, however, there is no evidence of honest 
signaling in this context.  Potential liabilities for faulty disclosures may 
render honest signaling costly and thus may create incentives for it.  As 
mentioned, however, liabilities for omitting corruption risks are far from 
certain.  Moreover, as Part IV will describe, there may be other incentives 
that could counter the incentives created by legal liabilities.  Consequently, 
as the next Part shows, in reality, not all China-based companies are 
disclosing corruption risks upon careful assessment of their respective 
 
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).  Information typically included in corruption risk factors 
does appear to be material according to such jurisprudence.  See supra Part I.  Furthermore, since 1976, 
the SEC has taken the position that “even if questionable or illegal payments are not quantitatively 
material, disclosure of such payments may be required because of their bearing on management’s 
competency or integrity.”  Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Disclosure of Information Bearing on Management 
Integrity and Competency, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 555, 581 (1981).  In addition, while some may argue that 
China’s corruption issues are widely reported and that whether corruption risk disclosure may really 
alter the “total mix” of information available to investors is an open question, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York has, in fact, in a recent case rejected a similar argument for 
immateriality.  See In re Fuwei Films Sec. Litig., 634 F. Supp. 2d 419, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that 
pre-IPO disclosures in a Chinese language news article did not render subsequent non-disclosure 
immaterial). 
 52.  See Amy Deen Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran: How Reductive Standards of Materiality Excuse 
Incomplete Disclosure Under the Securities Laws, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 13, 24–25 (2011). 
 53.  HAZEN, supra note 47, § 12.9[1]; see also STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES 
REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 45 (2d ed. 2008) (“[T]here is no general duty to disclose all 
material information . . . .”). 
 54.  For a classic description of the signaling game, including the concepts of separating 
equilibrium, semi-pooling equilibrium, and pooling equilibrium referenced in this Article, see generally 
A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED 
SCREENING PROCESSES 92–97 (1974). 
 55.  THOMAS LEE HAZEN & DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 110–11 (6th ed. 2003). 
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exposure.  From the perspective of investor protection, that can be quite 
problematic. 
III. DEFICIENT DISCLOSURE 
This Part presents some general observations on the disclosure 
practices adopted by China-based companies with respect to corruption 
risks.  Public filing searches, which can be inherently crude and 
incomplete, were used to observe patterns in available disclosures that are 
sufficiently revealing for the mission of this Article.56  As the following 
shows, the standard-based disclosure requirement has instead resulted in a 
“semi-pooling” equilibrium. 
A. Who Discloses? 
There are a number of China-based companies that have made 
corruption risk disclosures.  These disclosing companies mainly include 
pharmaceutical companies, “backdoor-listed” companies, and a small 
number of companies that went public through a conventional IPO process. 
Pharmaceutical and medical service companies are more likely to 
include a corruption risk factor in their IPO and periodic filings.57  The 
disclosure is likely driven by the widely-held perception that China’s 
pharmaceutical industry is subject to rampant corrupt practices and 
persistent government scrutiny and crackdown.58 
 
 56.  Specifically, Westlaw’s EDGAR Filing search tool was used to perform searches for filings 
on Form F-1, Form 20-F, Form S-1, and Form 10-K, with alternative search terms of “China /20 
corrupt!” and China /20 brib!.”  As of the latest search date of December 21, 2013, the first search 
yielded 1324 documents and the second 766 documents.  Those results are expected to include at least 
the vast majority of SEC filings by both China-based companies and multinationals that may have 
mentioned China’s corruption issues.  To confirm negative findings (i.e., firms that have not disclosed 
corruption risks), EDGAR pages for the relevant companies on the SEC website have also been double-
checked. 
 57.  See, e.g., China Kanghui Holdings, Prospectus (Form 424B4) 26–27 (Aug. 11, 2010); China 
Nuokang Bio-Pharm. Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 28 (Dec. 10, 2009); Simcere Pharm. Grp., 
Prospectus (Form 424B4) 18–19 (Apr. 20, 2007); Mindray Med. Int’l Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 
10 (Sept. 27, 2006).  But see ShangPharma Corp., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Oct. 19, 2010) (neglecting 
to mention corruption anywhere in its filings). 
 58.  See Mindray Med. Int’l Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20–F) (Apr. 8, 2013) (“Due to the 
conditions of competition in the markets for medical devices in China . . . [Mindray] believe[s] that 
corrupt practices may still occur . . . . [including] inappropriate and unlawful payments or favors to 
influence procurement decision of customers, regulatory approval decisions of the China Food and 
Drug Administration, or CFDA, and clinical trials conducted by Chinese hospitals and medical 
institutions. . . .  [Despite the company’s compliance efforts, it or its distributors may still violate anti-
bribery laws in various jurisdictions, for which it] could be required to pay damages or fines, which 
could materially and adversely affect [its] financial condition and results of operations.  In addition, [its] 
brand and reputation, [its] sales activities or the price of [its] ADSs could be adversely affected if [the] 
company becomes the target of any negative publicity as a result of actions taken by [the company] or 
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Many smaller and more obscure companies that obtained their U.S. 
listings through so-called “reverse mergers” instead of a conventional IPO 
process59 also disclose corruption risks.  Companies in this group span a 
wide range of industries.60  Consistent with empirical studies linking 
greater risk disclosures with higher litigation risks, such “backdoor-listed” 
companies may be advised to include corruption risk factors as protection 
against the growing hostility towards such companies since 2011.61 
Finally, a few better-known companies that went public through 
underwritten IPOs have disclosed or have just started to disclose corruption 
risks in filings.  For example, two hardware solution providers in the 
information technology sector, 21Vianet Group, Inc. and ChinaCache 
International Holdings Ltd., have included corruption risk factor 
disclosures in their documents.62  The disclosures of both companies are 
almost identical,63 and the language suggests that substantial government 
contracting by each of the companies is the major concern driving the 
disclosure.64  It is less clear why in 2013 Xinyuan Real Estate Co., Ltd., a 
China-based real estate company listed in New York, added a corruption 
 
[its] distributors.”). 
 59.  For a general introduction to these Chinese reverse merger companies, see generally Janelle 
A. McCarty, Note, Mergers & Accusations: Chinese Auditing and Corporate Disclosure Standards 
Indirectly on Trial in the United States, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 347 (2012). 
 60.  Such companies are in the pharmaceutical, food, manufacturing, petrochemical, and waste 
recycling industries, among others.  See e.g., Bohai Pharm. Grp., Inc., supra note 32; China Advanced 
Constr. Materials Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 20 (Sept. 25, 2013); China Xuefeng Envtl. Eng’g 
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (Sept. 11, 2013); Keyuan Petrochemicals Inc., Annual Report 
(Form 10-K) 38 (June 5, 2013); Asia Green Agric. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 20 (Mar. 29, 
2013). 
 61.  For background on the hostility against such companies, see McCarty, supra note 59, at 354–
55; see also David M. Katz, Chinese Reverse Mergers Spawned U.S. Class Actions, Report Says, CFO, 
May 22, 2012, http://www3.cfo.com/article/2012/5/m-a_reverse-mergers-china-firms-class-action-
cornerstone-research-heli-electronics. 
 62.  See 21Vianet Grp., Inc., supra note 33; ChinaCache Int’l Holdings Ltd., Annual Report (Form 
20–F) 14 (Apr. 26, 2013). 
 63.  ChinaCache apparently modeled its risk factor disclosure on 21Vianet Group’s after 
ChinaCache decided to include such a risk factor in its 2012 annual report filing.  21Vianet has had 
such a risk factor since its IPO prospectus in 2011.  See 21Vianet Grp., Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 
22 (Apr. 21, 2011); ChinaCache Int’l Holdings Ltd., supra note 62. 
 64.  See 21Vianet Grp., supra note 33, at 16 (“[21Vianet] operate[s] in the data center services 
industry in China and generally purchase[s] [its] hosting facilities and telecommunications resources 
from state or government-owned enterprises and sell[s] [its] services domestically to customers that 
include state or government-owned enterprises or government ministries, departments and agencies.  
This puts [it] in frequent contact with persons who may be considered ‘foreign officials’ under the 
FCPA, resulting in an elevated risk of potential FCPA violations.”); see also ChinaCache Int’l Holdings 
Ltd., supra note 62 (acknowledging similar issues in the content and application delivery services 
industry). 
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risk disclosure to both its 2012 annual report65 and a prospectus filed on 
Form F-3.66  In addition, China Commercial Credit, Inc., a small credit firm 
incorporated in Delaware that went public in August 2013, disclosed a risk 
factor that only concerns FCPA.67 
The reasons China-based companies choose to disclose corruption 
risks can be further speculated upon, but that is not the focus of this Article.  
It suffices to say that the above information suggests that at least some 
China-based companies signal their higher corruption risk exposure to 
investors. 
B. Who Does Not Disclose? 
Many well-known China-based companies have never disclosed 
corruption risk factors.  Such non-disclosing companies include, for 
example, large state-controlled enterprises (SCEs) in heavily regulated 
sectors such as oil and gas, energy, telecommunications, railroads, and 
airlines.68  PetroChina Co. Ltd. (PetroChina), the New York- and Hong 
Kong-cross-listed unit of China’s state-owned oil and gas giant, China 
National Petroleum Corp., is a good example of an SCE that faces 
exceptionally high risks of corruption.  Not only does PetroChina operate 
in the highly regulated oil and gas industry, which involves frequent 
contacts with domestic and foreign government authorities and other state-
backed counterparties, but its management and employees may also be 
deemed government officials under both the PRC Criminal Law69 and the 
FCPA.70  Despite PetroChina’s potentially significant exposure, it has 
never warned investors in its filings about the corruption risks inherent in 
its operations.71  This potential disclosure deficiency is more significant 
since late August 2013, when Chinese authorities initiated corruption 
investigations against several former and then-incumbent senior executives 
 
 65.  See Xinyuan Real Estate Co., Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 30 (Apr. 15, 2013). 
 66.  See Xinyuan Real Estate Co., Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B3) 19 (Nov. 18, 2013). 
 67.  See China Commercial Credit, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 24 (Aug. 14. 2013). 
 68.  See, e.g., China Mobile Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 25, 2013); China Unicom 
(Hong Kong) Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 25, 2013); Guangshen Ry. Co. Ltd., Annual 
Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 24, 2013); China Petroleum & Chem. Corp., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 
(Apr. 11, 2013); Huaneng Power Int’l Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 17, 2013). 
 69.  Article 93 of the PRC Criminal Law provides that state officials include persons carrying out 
public functions in state-owned companies.  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa (中华人民共和国
刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] art. 93 (promulgated by Order No. 83 of the 
President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 14, 1997, effective Mar. 14, 1997), 1997 STANDING 
COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 138. 
 70.  The FCPA’s definition of “foreign officials” has been interpreted liberally to cover employees 
of state-owned companies.  Warin et al., supra note 1, at 44. 
 71.  See, e.g., PetroChina Co. Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 26, 2013). 
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of PetroChina, leading to declines in share prices in both New York and 
Hong Kong.72  In September 2013, investors filed two securities class 
action complaints against PetroChina in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, alleging that PetroChina had made false 
and misleading statements and had failed to disclose material facts with 
respect to its corruption issues.73  Other New York-listed large Chinese 
SCEs such as Sinopec74 and China Mobile,75 which have also experienced 
turmoil in recent years due to corruption investigations, have not disclosed 
any corruption risks either. 
SCEs are not alone in adopting a non-disclosure approach for 
corruption risks.  Many privately owned companies that went public 
through conventional IPOs do not mention either general or specific 
corruption risks facing their operations in China.76  Many of these 
companies operate in the high-tech sector,77 which may be perceived as 
 
 72.  On the day the news broke, PetroChina’s NYSE-traded American depositary declined by 4%.  
PetroChina Falls as Corruption Probe Expanded, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK NEWS, Aug. 28, 2013, 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2013-08-28/petrochina-falls-as-corruption-probe-expanded.  
PetroChina’s Hong Kong-listed shares dropped by 4.4% following a one-day suspension.  Isabella 
Steger & Mia Lamar, PetroChina Loses $1 Billion in Market Value, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2013, 5:16 
AM ET, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323324904579040200172694292. 
 73.  See Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws at 2–6, Hsu v. 
Petrochina Co., No. 13 Civ. 6274 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2013); Class Action Complaint for Violations of 
the Federal Securities Laws at 2–4, Broux v. Petrochina Co., No. 13 CV 6180 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2013) 
[hereinafter Broux Complaint]. 
 74.  In 2009, Sinopec’s former chairman was convicted of bribery.  Shai Oster, Sinopec Ex-chief 
Convicted of Graft, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2009, at A.8, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB124764264846943917. 
 75.  Since 2010, China Mobile, the largest state-owned telecommunications operator, has counted 
14 senior executives prosecuted or convicted for corruption-related crimes, including one in a recent 
investigation initiated around the same time as the PetroChina probe.  Liao Zhijie, Chen Yong & Wu 
Qiaofa (廖志杰, 陈勇, 吴侨发), Zhong Yi Dong Fan Fu Si Nian Shi Si Ren Luo Ma: Chuan Nei Bu 
Ming Dan Shang Wei Zhua Wan (中移动反腐四年14人落马: 传内部名单尚未抓完) [Four Years of 
Anti-corruption Campaign Counted 14 Fallen Executives in China Mobile: The Prosecution Is Likely to 
Continue] Xin Lang Ke Ji (新浪科技) [SINA TECH.] (Aug. 24, 2013, 05:27), http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/ 
2013-08-24/05278671558.shtml. 
 76.  For example, only one of the eight companies that completed an IPO in 2013 included a 
corruption risk factor in its prospectus.  See China Commercial Credit, Inc., supra note 67.  None of the 
others included similar disclosure language.  See Autohome Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Dec. 11, 
2013); 500.com Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Nov. 22, 2013); Sungy Mobile Ltd., Prospectus (Form 
424B4) (Nov. 22, 2013); Qunar Cayman Is. Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Nov. 1, 2013); 58.com 
Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Oct. 31,2013); Montage Tech. Grp. Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 
(Sept. 26, 2013); LightInTheBox Holding Co., Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (June 6, 2013). 
 77.  One account done in April 2012 shows that the largest group of China-based companies listed 
in the United States were from the technology sector. See Yingjie Zhang, The Study on the Entry 
Mechanisms by Chinese Companies to the U.S. Market 15 (May 17, 2012) (unpublished B.S. thesis, 
State University of New York at Albany), available at http://www.albany.edu/honorscollege/files/ 
Zhang_Thesis_Final.pdf. 
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relatively less susceptible to corruption.  But some of these companies 
operate in more vulnerable industries, including resources and mining,78 
renewable energy,79 insurance,80 machinery and equipment,81 education,82 
media,83 and state-sponsored lotteries,84 which are highly regulated and 
involve considerable government contacts in daily operations.  There is a 
strong case for the latter group to disclose corruption risks. 
C. A “Semi-Pooling” Equilibrium 
As the preceding sections suggest, it is possible that quite a number of 
China-based companies with high corruption risks, including both SCEs 
and privately owned companies, have chosen not to warn their investors 
about such risks.  Therefore, the equilibrium for the signaling game of risk 
disclosure under the materiality standard seems to be “semi-pooling,” at 
which some high-risk issuers are sending the same messages to investors as 
low-risk issuers.  Normally, an investor may expect to be able to 
differentiate the corruption risk exposure of, for example, a large SCE such 
as PetroChina from that of an online social network operator by comparing 
risk disclosures.  But at this equilibrium, the investors may not find this a 
straightforward task since neither company includes any corruption risk 
disclosures. 
This is, of course, not to say that reasonable investors would be 
unduly naïve to think it plausible that the SCE and the internet company 
hold the same good faith belief that they face immaterial corruption issues.  
Instead, non-disclosure by otherwise high-risk companies could be 
interpreted by investors as a signal of such companies’ private knowledge 
that even visibly serious corruption risks in their industry are unlikely to 
have any quantifiably significant impact on them.  From the perspective of 
outside investors, those companies, by not disclosing risk factors, could be 
signaling their “inside assessment” about how China’s anti-corruption 
campaigns work and their justifiable confidence in their capability of 
managing the process without damages.  In hindsight, however, signals as 
such are most often misleading for the investors.  The failure of high-risk 
China-based companies to disclose corruption risks and the presence of the 
 
 78.  See, e.g., Yanzhou Coal Mining Co. Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 27, 2012). 
 79.  See, e.g., China Ming Yang Wind Power Grp. Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 30, 
2012); Yingli Green Energy Holding Co. Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 26, 2012). 
 80.  See, e.g., CNINSURE Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 24, 2012). 
 81.  See, e.g., WSP Holdings Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 30, 2012). 
 82.  See, e.g., New Oriental Educ. & Tech. Grp. Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Oct. 12, 2012). 
 83.  See, e.g., Phoenix New Media Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 27, 2012). 
 84.  See, e.g., 500.com Ltd., supra note 76. 
DAI MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2014  9:33 PM 
420 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:403 
semi-pooling equilibrium suggest that the standard-based requirement is 
not effective for the disclosure of corruption risks. 
IV. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN DISCLOSURE DRAFTING 
Practitioners have debated whether it is necessary or prudent for U.S. 
public companies with international operations to include risk factor 
language on FCPA compliance issues.85  While some believe that the 
regulatory burdens and liability risks that the FCPA imposes on companies 
are significant enough to merit a risk factor,86 others are skeptical about the 
benefits.87  The PetroChina case described earlier seems to support the 
more cautious stance.  In one complaint, plaintiffs alleged that PetroChina 
“made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) 
the Company’s senior officials were in non-compliance with the 
Company’s corporate governance directives and code of ethics . . . (4) the 
Company lacked adequate internal and financial controls . . . .”88  If 
PetroChina had even included a general risk factor to balance its disclosure 
about compliance, it may have at least benefitted from having an easier 
argument against the plaintiffs. 
Commentators speculate that China’s ongoing anti-corruption 
campaign could place the securities disclosures of many more China-based 
companies under close scrutiny like that of PetroChina.89  Until that 
actually happens, however, the perceived benefits of easier risk 
management may not provide adequate incentive for better corruption risk 
disclosure due to the challenges in the practical process of disclosure 
drafting discussed above, which lead many companies to avoid mentioning 
corruption in their disclosure documents. 
This Part discusses such challenges, drawing primarily from 
observations on the ground.90  Two useful preliminary notes should be 
made here to clarify some definitional issues.  First, although securities 
information is primarily required to be disclosed by corporate issuers, the 
typical process of disclosure drafting often involves professional 
 
 85.  See Di Schino, supra note 27, at 6 (noting that the necessity and prudence of disclosing in 
filings that a company is subject to the FCPA is unsettled). 
 86.  Id. at 7. 
 87.  Id. at 8 (quoting Claudius Sokenu, a partner at Shearman & Sterling LLP) (“[I]f [a] company 
has an FCPA problem down the road, I’m not really sure what pointing to that general risk factor gets 
the company.”). 
 88.  Broux Complaint, supra note 73, at 4. 
 89.  LaCroix, supra note 16. 
 90.  These observations are based on the author’s previous practice experience and discussions 
with other lawyers specializing in capital markets transactions and securities compliance work. 
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intermediaries, such as outside lawyers and independent accountants.  
Where disclosure documents are being prepared for offering transactions, 
disclosure decisions also reflect significant inputs from investment banks 
that serve as underwriters of the relevant offerings and thus can be held 
liable for statements made in the disclosure documents.  Due to the lack of 
both knowledge and language proficiency, most China-based companies 
have relied on professional intermediaries for disclosure drafting to a much 
greater extent than U.S.-based public companies typically do.  As a result, 
disclosure decisions need to be understood in the context of the incentives 
and behavior of both the issuers and the professional intermediaries 
involved in the drafting process. 
Second, while companies draft securities disclosures, including risk 
disclosures, for both offering transactions and periodic filings, this Part 
focuses on examining the dynamics of disclosure drafting in the former 
context, mainly for the purpose of economizing the discussion, since all 
important factors can be found in the transactional context but not 
necessarily in the periodic filing context.  For example, the disclosure 
incentives for underwriters can be observed only in transactions.  In 
addition, as a practical matter, China-based companies review disclosure 
issues much more closely in the transactional context.  Risk factors drafted 
during the transactional process are also likely to be adopted and to remain 
“sticky” (i.e., virtually unchanged, even where language adjustment is 
appropriate) in periodic filings, especially for many China-based issuers 
that have short listing histories.91 
A. Issuer Disincentives 
China-based issuers typically face considerable disincentives to 
mention corruption risks in their public disclosure documents, especially in 
securities offering documents.  Both corporate issuers and underwriters 
want the best possible pricing in offering transactions.  Issuers, as advised 
by many investment banking professionals in China, still believe that the 
negative connotations of risks could hamper marketing efforts92 and should 
be avoided absent clear legal mandates.  Furthermore, many Chinese 
 
 91.  The stickiness of risk factor information in China-based company filings has also been 
analyzed as it relates to country risks in general.  See Friedman, supra note 50, at 245–55 (finding that 
many China-based issuers made little change to country risk languages in their filings between mid-
1990 and 2005 despite significant changes in underlying circumstances in China). 
 92.  Although many practicing lawyers tend to dismiss such concerns when raised by issuers and 
underwriters in transactions, recent empirical evidence suggests that a negative disclosure tone indeed 
affects cost of capital and firm value.  See Campbell et al., supra note 24, at 399 
(“[N]egative/pessimistic disclosure increases cost of capital when a combined set of information 
sources is analyzed . . . .”). 
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issuers, including but definitely not limited to SCEs, are reluctant to 
disclose corruption risks due to the fear of such disclosure’s potential 
practical ramifications within China.  Many companies see no point in 
inviting the Chinese government’s closer scrutiny by putting on record that 
their business faces high corruption risks.  Companies that conduct 
business or otherwise interact frequently with government bodies also raise 
concerns at drafting meetings that valuable or critical business relationships 
could be risked if they imply or even insinuate in public documents that 
corrupt practices may exist in their dealings with government 
counterparties. 
B. Lack of Due Diligence Opportunities 
Corporate and securities law scholarship has extensively discussed the 
supposed “gatekeeper” role that professional intermediaries play in 
complex business transactions such as securities offerings.93  Typically, the 
negative consequences of potential legal liabilities and loss of reputation 
should make intermediaries more risk-averse than their clients on 
compliance matters such as disclosure.  Nevertheless, in China-based 
securities transactions, professional intermediaries involved in the 
disclosure drafting process, such as underwriters and lawyers, also face 
weighty practical considerations against disclosing corruption risks.  
Generally, investment banks’ internal policies place considerable emphasis 
on controlling anti-corruption compliance risks in connection with their 
securities underwriting business.94  Bankers and the lawyers running 
transactions on the ground, however, have extremely limited means to 
conduct meaningful anti-corruption due diligence with China-based issuer 
clients.  Market-accepted diligence practice usually consists of no more 
than one highly formalistic Q&A session with the issuer’s management, 
which is unlikely to catch any “red flags.”95  Basic background checks are 
routinely performed through web searches, which usually reveal few 
 
 93.  See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The 
Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); Andrew F. Tuch, 
Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583 (2010). 
 94.  See, e.g., Wendy Wysong, Why, Whether and When the FCPA Matters in Capital Market 
Transactions: The Asian Perspective, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Mar. 5, 2014), available at http:// 
www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/why-whether-and-when-the-fcpa-matters-in-capital-market-
transactions-the-asian-perspective/ (noting that investment banks’ concern about FCPA risks has been 
rising in Asian capital markets transactions). 
 95.  Typically, questions are framed in a “yes or no” fashion, seeking the knowledge of the 
management about potential compliance issues.  Management expectedly answers “no” to all questions 
without explaining much further. 
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notable prior issues on the record.  More thorough independent 
investigations are believed to be performed much less often than before, as 
such investigations have become increasingly risky in China.96  Without the 
benefit of adequate and meaningful due diligence opportunities, the 
underwriters and lawyers have little basis on which to advise in favor of 
disclosure. 
Over the years, the transactional dynamic has become increasingly 
issuer-dominated due to intensified competition for securities underwriting 
business in China’s market.97  Transactions underwritten by more than two 
lead banks have become the norm, and issuers are often not hesitant to fire 
or change underwriters even just before their deals launch.  Although 
Chinese issuers still rely heavily on professionals to put together the 
necessary paperwork, they tend to treat underwriters and lawyers as 
functionaries rather than “gatekeepers,” and they are not inclined to 
concede to the professionals on sensitive diligence and disclosure issues.98  
These dynamics are particularly unfavorable for corruption risk diligence 
and disclosure.  Any underwriter in the syndicate will certainly find it silly 
to push the issuer “too hard” on corruption risk diligence and disclosure 
while letting its competitor win the client’s favor by being “reasonable.”99 
As diligence and disclosure have become much harder to obtain from 
the issuers, the investment banks have tended to fall back on other 
conventional risk management tools available to underwriters, such as 
issuer representations and warranties in the underwriting agreement and the 
“10b-5/disclosure letter” provided by lawyers.  These tools, however, are 
not a perfect substitute for due diligence, as they afford no direct protection 
 
 96.  See, e.g., Jane Perlez, In China, the Dangers of Due Diligence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/business/global/china-hems-in-private-sleuths-seeking-
fraud.html?_r=0 (reporting incidents illustrating challenges and dangers, including the risk of criminal 
prosecutions, facing business investigators in China). 
 97.  As the recent media report on and SEC investigations of J.P. Morgan’s hiring practices in 
China revealed, competition has even driven the international investment banks to engage in 
questionable conduct themselves.  Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, On Defensive, JPMorgan 
Hired China’s Elite, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 29, 2013, 9:22 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2013/12/29/on-defensive-jpmorgan-hired-chinas-elite/ (documenting J.P. Morgan’s internal 
communications, which revealed its program to hire children of government officials for the purpose of 
competing with other investment banks for mandates). 
 98.  Similar phenomenon and the negative consequences thereof have been noticed in general in 
business transactions with multiple “gatekeepers.”  See Tuch, supra note 93, at 1604 (describing the 
troubling prospect that a corporate issuer may interpose itself between the various professional 
gatekeepers so that none of them can effectively monitor such issuer). 
 99.  Cf. supra Part III.A (noting that the filings of many “backdoor-listed” China-based companies 
and of tiny IPO companies such as China Commercial Credit often include corruption risk language, 
probably because such smaller companies have much less leverage over their financial and legal 
advisors and tend to largely defer to them on disclosure issues). 
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to the investors that are not parties to the documents.  In addition, negative 
assurance provided in a law firm’s 10b-5 letter is based on the relevant 
lawyers’ actual subjective belief, which is inherently limited by the scope 
of their substantive inquiries.100  Furthermore, also as a result of 
competition, China-based issuers have become much less receptive to 
terms contained in investment banks’ allegedly “form” underwriting 
agreements, and many have attempted to cut back the more robust 
representations and warranties contained in the underwriting agreement.101 
C. Market Norm and Group Think 
Disclosure drafting practice has a highly conformist aspect.  In 
particular, where the standard-based disclosure requirement offers little 
specific guidance, disclosure drafters often reference market practices.102  
Although some have noted that “group think” seems to steer U.S.-based 
issuers towards including FCPA risk language in filings,103 for China-based 
companies, the collective force has moved in the opposite direction.  As a 
good number of non-disclosing issuers can be found on the market, non-
disclosure has become the market norm, the deviation from which is 
generally discouraged.  This norm makes it easier for the issuers to 
rationalize their preference for non-disclosure and makes it harder for 
underwriters and lawyers to request that issuers cooperate with enhanced 
corruption risk due diligence and disclosure where appropriate.  China-
based issuers often take such a pro-disclosure stance by the professional 
intermediaries as a lack of trust, especially if those parties have a prior 
record of working for other China-based companies that do not disclose 
 
 100.  Subcommittee on Securities Law Opinions, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, 
ABA Section of Business Law, Report, Negative Assurance in Securities Offerings (2008 Revision), 64 
BUS. LAW. 395, 403 (2009); see also Tuch, supra note 93, at 1657 (noting an “apparent gap in 
liability . . . concern[ing] the basis of knowledge on which lawyers’ negative assurance [in the 10b-5 
letters] rests.”). 
 101.  See Youku.com Inc., Form of Underwriting Agreement (Form F-1/A, Ex-1.1) § 1(a)(lxviii) 
(Dec. 3, 2010) (illustrating “clean” representation language, without a knowledge qualifier, in the 
issuer’s representation on anti-corruption law in a securities underwriting/purchase agreement, which is 
rare); see also Sungy Mobile Ltd., Underwriting Agreement (Form F-1/A, Ex.-1.1) § 2(1)(xliii) (Nov. 
20, 2013) (illustrating that the knowledge qualifier can sometimes expand to apply to directors and 
officers, which is arguably not “market”); Baidu.com, Inc., Underwriting Agreement (Form F-1/A, Ex-
1.1) § 1(a)(lxxviii) (Aug. 4, 2005) (illustrating that the knowledge qualifier can sometimes expand to 
apply to the issuer itself, which is arguably not “market”).  More aggressive cutbacks on anti-corruption 
representation language by the issuers have been seen in non-registered deals, but the 
underwriting/purchase agreements are not publicly available. 
 102.  See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities Disclosure Practice, 
80 TUL. L. REV. 1023, 1024–25 (describing certain network effects in disclosure practices that involve 
attorneys looking to the market standard disclosure practices as an indicator of the required disclosures). 
 103.  Di Schino, supra note 27, at 5–6. 
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corruption risks.  They also think that much of the requested diligence and 
disclosure is greater than the market standard and not legally required and 
that it simply serves the professional intermediaries’ interest in managing 
their own exposure.  Issuers are unlikely to be sympathetic to such 
disclosure advice, especially if any additional diligence or disclosure puts 
strains on the often ultra-tight transaction timeline or if it potentially affects 
the deal’s marketing prospects. 
V. CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT WITH A RULE-BASED 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 
The practical dynamics in the disclosure drafting process create 
considerable counterforces to the interest of issuers and intermediaries in 
due diligence and a more adequate disclosure of corruption risks.  
Consequently, investors have lost the benefit of not only accurate 
information with which to evaluate risk but also potentially better risk 
management that might result from greater attention and from measures 
adopted as a result of adequate due diligence and disclosure analysis. 
This Article proposes to replace the materiality standard with a rule-
based requirement for the disclosure of corruption risks.  Unlike the 
standard-based requirement, a rule-based disclosure requirement would 
remove much of the discretion of the issuer, as advised by professional 
intermediaries, over the disclosure of specified information. 
The “rule versus standard” dichotomy, however, consists of possible 
middle points between the “pure” forms at the two extremes.  Some 
disclosure requirements in the form of a rule may nevertheless have a 
materiality component.  For example, Item 5.A. of Form 20-F requires 
foreign private issuers to “[d]escribe the impact of inflation, if material.”104  
Similarly, a standard-based requirement can also incorporate rule-like 
components.  Item 3.D. of Form 20-F, which documents the general 
standard for risk factor disclosures by foreign private issuers, nevertheless 
makes the disclosure of risks mentioned in a few examples similar to being 
regulated by rule-based requirements.105  Legal norms in such intermediary, 
blended forms do not eliminate the issuer’s judgment in producing 
disclosures as much as a pure rule.  For disclosure of corruption risks, an 
alternative disclosure requirement might take the form of a brightline rule, 
requiring any issuers having significant operations (perhaps over a defined 
threshold) in high-corruption-risk jurisdictions to prominently disclose a 
risk factor.  Alternatively, the rule might adopt a softer form by asking 
 
 104.  FORM 20-F, supra note 41, Item 5.A. 
 105.  See supra note 45 (quoting the risk factors that Item 3.D. suggests that issuers disclose). 
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issuers to describe their exposure to corruption risk in high-risk 
jurisdictions “if material.”  The SEC might even look beyond risk factors 
and consider requiring issuers to specifically describe their anti-corruption 
compliance programs in prominent parts of their filings, such as the 
“Business” section; state their subjective evaluation of such programs’ 
effectiveness; and then allow them to include accompanying risk factor 
language. 
These alternative approaches might create different incentives for 
corruption risk disclosure, and the SEC might choose among them based on 
policy considerations.  But here it suffices to note that any of these 
approaches would be more effective than the current materiality standard at 
promoting informative disclosure of corruption risk based on more careful 
due diligence and analysis.  By giving unequivocal notice to issuers that the 
Commission views corruption risk as one area of regulatory focus, the 
alternative requirements could elevate deliberation and diligence on 
corruption risks to a much higher priority in the disclosure drafting process.  
An explicit legal requirement should greatly reduce the incentive of issuers 
and intermediaries to take chances by remaining willfully ignorant.  Even 
where issuers find the corruption topic sensitive and prefer avoiding it as 
much as possible, underwriters and legal advisors could feel much less 
stress when raising it with clients by pointing to legal requirements 
expressly referencing corruption risks.  Especially for underwriters, 
requesting with a straight face additional diligence information and 
disclosure discussion time from the issuer would be much easier if the 
matter were a legal requirement rather than simply the bank’s internal 
policy.  For China-based issuers, explicit regulatory requirements should 
also alleviate their concerns about risk disclosure’s potential ramifications 
at home.  They could relatively easily explain to their government 
counterparties that the disclosure is made mostly to fulfill explicit 
regulatory requirements in connection with their overseas financing 
activities.  If the rule-based requirement could incentivize China-based 
companies to generally more often include corruption risk language in 
filings, issuers would also worry less about drawing unwanted attention 
from Chinese anti-bribery authorities simply for making such disclosure. 
Overall, a rule-based requirement should counter much of the 
challenges present in the disclosure drafting process under the materiality 
standard.  Increased disclosure because of changed incentives in the 
drafting process might provide the market with more adequate information.  
With greater issuer cooperation, higher quality due diligence would also 
afford investors further protection by increasing the chance of uncovering 
issues and taking feasible remedial measures before launching the 
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transaction in the market. 
VI. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE RULE-BASED APPROACH 
This Part offers a preliminary discussion of a few possible objections 
to the adoption of rule-based disclosure requirements for corruption risks.  
Rather than preempting such objections, the major goal here is to explore 
angles for further consideration of using disclosures effectively to regulate 
corruption risks in securities investment. 
A. Just Another Example of Lawyers Asking for Useless Additional 
Disclosures? 
A rule-based disclosure requirement should induce a greater number 
of corruption risk disclosures by China-based issuers.  Some suggest that 
disclosure is “at worst, harmless”106 and can provide no more than “too 
much information.”107  Others, in contrast, worry that too much disclosure 
does more harm than good, as it may cause information overload.108  
Moreover, some argue that the pervasive mandated disclosure is a failure as 
the disclosed information is often wastefully under-utilized by the group 
that the disclosure requirements are intended to inform and protect.109 
The SEC has looked to enhance risk disclosures in recent years.110  In 
October 2013, current Chair of the SEC Mary Jo White noted that the 
lengthy risk factor sections in filings may suggest a problem of information 
overload to which the Commission needs to attend in considering a 
potential overhaul of disclosure requirements.111  Without disputing in 
principle the concern of information overload, this Article has argued that 
more clearly stipulated disclosure mandates in the specific context of 
corruption risks of China-based securities may enhance investor protection.  
 
 106.  Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software Licensing, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 95, 107 (2011). 
 107.  STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 163 (1982). 
 108.  See WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION 
90 (1992)  (“Some authors have theorized that . . . consumers may become overloaded with information 
and respond to the additional information by making worse decisions.”); OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL 
E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 169-
82  (2014) (arguing that mandated disclosures can have perverse effects). 
 109.  See generally BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 108, at 33–54 (describing various 
documented failures of mandated disclosure). 
 110.  Sarah Johnson, SEC Pushes Companies for More Risk Information, CFO MAG., Sept. 1, 2010, 
at 16, available at http://ww2.cfo.com/risk-compliance/2010/09/sec-pushes-companies-for-more-risk-
info/. 
 111.  Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the National Association of 
Corporate Directors Leadership Conference 2013: The Path Forward on Disclosure (Oct. 15, 2013), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539878806#.UrhZgbThfHY. 
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As opposed to average consumers, securities investors unsurprisingly are 
found to actually consider and respond to such information.112  The 
presence of a savvy investment community that constantly studies and 
digests company disclosures also makes it much more likely that securities 
disclosure will have an impact.  Moreover, as Parts IV and V discussed, 
enhanced disclosure requirements for corruption risks could respond to 
challenges posed by practical social dynamics that hamper good due 
diligence and deliberation during the disclosure drafting process; 
improvement in the due diligence and deliberation process would provide 
greater protection to investors than disclosed information itself. 
Under the rule-based requirement, all China-based companies might 
simply include a corruption risk in their filings so that a “semi-pooling” 
equilibrium would again prevent investors from distinguishing low-
corruption-risk companies from high-risk ones.  Even if that is the case, 
however, such pooling would be superior to the current equilibrium, at 
which investors can mistakenly interpret the non-disclosure by high-risk 
companies as signaling insignificant risk.113  Nevertheless, since low-risk 
issuers would still have incentives to achieve better pricing, the rule-based 
disclosure requirements could be designed to better promote differentiated 
signals.  For example, a rule might incorporate a materiality component 
requiring all China-based companies to disclose corruption risk factors 
“unless they do not have material exposure” to such risk.  Such rule would 
prevent issuers and underwriters from ignoring corruption risks but would 
allow non-disclosure if they were to conclude after careful evaluation that 
they had immaterial risk.  In addition, the SEC should tolerate, as it in fact 
very often does, mitigating language114 in corruption risk factors, such as 
statements about the issuer’s industry being less susceptible to corruption 
than other sectors in China.  Furthermore, as noted earlier, China-based 
issuers might be required to describe their anti-corruption compliance 
programs affirmatively in prominent sections of the filings.  Where risk 
factor language used by different issuers might be reduced to boilerplates, 
disclosure of risk control would offer some issuers another opportunity to 
signal their relatively low corruption risks. 
 
 112.  See Campbell et al., supra note 24. 
 113.  See supra Part III.C. 
 114.  The Staff generally advises against using mitigating language, such as clauses that begin with 
“while,” “although,” or “however,” in risk factors.  See, e.g., Staff Observations in the Review of 
Smaller Reporting Company IPOs, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www. 
sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfsmallcompanyregistration.htm. 
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B. Cost Matters? 
Although implementing a rule-based requirement might generate 
benefits currently unavailable under the materiality standard, one may 
wonder if such benefits would be worth the associated cost.115  Without 
engaging in a more rigorous cost-benefit analysis, intuitively, incremental 
cost incurred by a rule-based requirement is unlikely to be excessive.  The 
cost of additional drafting will be per se minimal given the existence of 
decent precedent disclosure language on the market.116  Greater cost might 
arise if issuers and underwriters are motivated by the disclosure 
requirement to conduct enhanced anti-corruption due diligence and spend 
greater time deliberating risk issues.  But a large part of such cost can be 
deemed private because the enhanced diligence work often enhances firm 
value through improved governance and risk control. 
C. Isn’t the Current Requirement for Reporting on Internal Controls 
Sufficient? 
The Exchange Act Rules require that registered companies maintain 
internal controls over financial reporting and include in their annual 
shareholder reports both management and auditor attestations on internal 
controls.117  Devising and maintaining effective internal controls can indeed 
overlap with a company’s effort to control corruption risk.  But the 
compliance reality in China suggests that even companies with formal 
internal controls attested to by auditors in accordance with the applicable 
standard may still be susceptible to systemic corruption risks.118  Moreover, 
the internal control report requirement is often less stringent on China-
based companies, as many of them, being smaller or newly public, qualify 
for an exemption.119  An enhanced requirement for the disclosure of 
 
 115.  Even the SOX burden is actually less than usually claimed, however.  See Erica Fung, 
Regulatory Competition in International Capital Markets: Evidence from China in 2004–2005, 3 
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 243, 264 (2006) (noting a remark made by a financial/legal advisor in China that the 
frequently complained-of financial disclosure standards under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are not 
“difficult to meet” and that foreign issuers often “exaggerate the burden”). 
 116.  See supra Part I. 
 117.  See (Item 308) Internal Control over Financial Reporting, 17 C.F.R. § 229.308 (2013); 
Controls and Procedures, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15 (2013); Controls and Procedures, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.15d-15 (2013). 
 118.  See, e.g., PetroChina Co. Ltd., supra note 71, at 98 (concluding that PetroChina’s internal 
controls were effective, which was attested to by its auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers). 
 119.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b)–(c) (2012) (requiring domestic and foreign registrants that are 
non-accelerated filers or “emerging growth companies” to include the management report but not the 
auditor attestation report on internal control); 17 C.F.R. § 229.308 (exempting a company that has 
newly conducted an IPO from complying with the internal control reporting requirements until its 
second annual report filed with the SEC). 
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corruption risk factors might be useful for duly warning investors and for 
reminding issuers about the inherent limit on standard internal control.  
This additional incentive would be particularly favorable if the incremental 
cost is limited. 
D. Is a Chinese Problem Worth a General Rule of U.S. Securities 
Regulation? 
It is nothing novel for U.S. securities laws to impose heightened 
disclosure requirements relating to specific countries.120  In the vaguely 
drafted Item 3.D. of Form 20-F, the SEC suggested that an issuer consider 
disclosing risks “relating to the country where it operates.”121  Although 
this Article discusses corruption risks relating to China-based securities, 
however, corruption risks are definitely not special to China.  As they are 
beyond the scope of this Article, further studies may look into whether 
securities disclosures by issuers from such other jurisdictions as India and 
Latin America face similar deficiencies in disclosing corruption risks.  
Conceptually, designing a rule-based disclosure requirement to cover 
countries with high corruption risks in general would not be too difficult.  
The scope of such a rule’s application might be defined, for example, by 
referring to third-party corruption research, such as the Corruption 
Perception Index published by Transparency International.122 
CONCLUSION 
Corruption poses multifaceted risks to securities investors who look 
for protection provided by securities regulation.  Some have argued that it 
may have been an over-stretch for the SEC to deviate from its core 
institutional mission by engaging in the battle against overseas corruption 
by actively enforcing the FCPA.123  This Article serves as a reminder that 
there is still potential room to improve the regulation of corruption risks 
through enhanced risk disclosure requirements and that such regulatory 
effort would fall squarely within the parameters of the U.S. securities laws’ 
core mission of protecting investors by promoting full disclosure of 
information.  Drawing upon filing searches and practical observations, this 
Article calls for attention to the practical challenges present in the securities 
 
 120.  A recent example is the addition of Section 13(r) to the Exchange Act, requiring issuers to 
disclose dealings with Iran.  Notice Required by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 
of 2012 to Be Filed Through EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 19, 2012), http:// 
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfannouncements/itr-act2012.htm. 
 121.  FORM 20-F, supra note 41, Item 3.D. 
 122.  See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 2. 
 123.  See, e.g., Black, supra note 18, at 1095. 
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disclosure drafting process, which are understood to contribute to deficient 
corruption risk disclosures by China-based companies.  By replacing the 
current disclosure requirement based on the materiality standard with a 
rule-based requirement, both disclosures of and underlying due diligence 
on corruption risks should more effectively inform and protect investors in 
China-based securities. 
As the SEC is conducting its latest round of reviews of the securities 
disclosure regime, the announced regulatory preferences seem to be 
streamlining risk disclosures and eliminating boilerplates.124  Even though 
improvement is due, this Article suggests that ideas for reform should not 
be anchored to only reducing disclosure.  Instead, the Commission should 
remain open to different options and carefully analyze the behavioral 
impacts of different forms of disclosure requirements.125  While the 
findings and observations in this Article are inherently qualified by its 
limited methodology,126 future studies may employ more rigorous 
empirical analytical tools to shed further light on how disclosures may be 
more effectively used as a relatively inexpensive way to regulate 
investment risks. 
 
 124.  See White, supra note 111 (using risk factors disclosure as an example for disclosure 
language that might have grown more lengthy than really needed). 
 125.  For an interesting proposal to reform risk factor disclosures based on the insights from 
behavioral law and economics, see Tom C. W. Lin, A Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk, 34 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 325 (2011). 
 126.  See supra notes 56 and 90. 
